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Abstract 
This paper aims to analyze the effects of the quality of institutions on the total tax burden through the informal 
sector in WAEMU countries over the period 1996-2015. The estimation of the parameters by GMPs shows that 
the improvement in the quality of the institutional environment reduces the size of the informal sector and this 
reduction in the size of the informal sector in turn leads to an increase in the tax burden rate. It also shows that the 
level of development and trade openness improve the total tax burden of WAEMU countries, while inflation, the 
share of agriculture and the informal sector in GDP reduce the total tax burden. As for the share of natural resources 
in GDP, its effect on fiscal pressure is ambiguous because it varies according to the indicator used to measure the 
quality of institutions in the regression.      
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1. Introduction 
Financing for development in countries can only be based on external financing. It is necessary to mobilize the 
country's internal resources for this purpose. These internal resources are essentially based on tax revenues (Romer, 
1986; Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). It is therefore clear that the mobilization of fiscal resources is 
imperative for developing countries. Indeed, as Colm and Helzner (1958) the evolution of fiscal structures is linked 
to evolution of economic growth. Indeed, according to Aghion and Howitt (1992), a good tax policy encourages 
firms to invest in physical capital and innovation. These investments lead to wealth creation and job creation, 
which improves economic growth and development.  In WAEMU countries, tax revenue mobilization is weak. In 
fact, over the period 1996 to 2015, the share of tax revenue in GDP was on average 11.94% annually (World Bank, 
2018).  This rate is lower than the minimum rate of 20% suggested in the framework of multilateral surveillance 
of WAEMU countries. This weakness in tax revenue is also observed in an environment where the quality of 
institutions is less brilliant (World Government Indicator (WDI), 2018).  In addition to these facts, there is a large 
preponderance of informality in these countries (WAEMU). Indeed, according to a study by the International 
Monetary Fund (Medina and Schneider, 2018), the size of the informal sector, approximated by the contribution 
of the informal sector to GDP, was close to 50%. This size is very large compared to other regions of the world 
(34% for Southeast Asia and 23% for Europe, according to the same study). The low tax revenue mobilization 
capacity in developing countries reflects the need to seek new reforms tailored to the specific case of these 
countries. In this respect, Kaldor (1963) suggests that any tax reform must be accompanied by political will, since 
a country's tax system reflects its political institutions. Furthermore, Chambas (1994; 2005) argues that Sub-
Saharan African countries need a profound reform in organization of tax administrations for a successful tax 
transition. This weak mobilization is also attributed to the large size of the informal economy in developing 
countries. Thus, authors such as Ruge (2010); Tafenau et al, (2010), Herwartz et al, (2015), Remeikiene et al, 
(2014), suggest that large size of informal economy is impediment to tax revenue mobilization. Notwithstanding 
these facts, it seems that preponderance of informality in developing countries is attributable to the low quality of 
institutions in these countries. Indeed, according to authors such as Chong and Gradstein (2004), Krakowski (2005), 
Schneider and Badekow (2006), Schneider (2010); development of country’s informal economy is mainly due to 
the poor quality of public institutions in that country. 
 It thus appears that firstly, low institutional quality leads to a large size of the informal economy and secondly, 
low institutional quality hinders the mobilization of tax revenues. This paper based therefore on the theoretical 
literature, attempts to determine the effect of the informal economy on the tax burden, through the quality of 
institutions. Specifically, the paper examines whether improving the quality of institutions by reducing the size of 
the informal economy will improve tax revenue mobilization. In the remainder of the paper, we first present a 
synthesis of the literature, then the methodology and variables used, and finally the results and their interpretation, 
followed by a conclusion.  
 
2.  Literature  
In this literature, the authors explain the size of the informal sector by quality of institutions, and show that this 
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quality affects tax revenue mobilization through the size of the informal sector.  
Theoretically, Friedman et al (2000) show that entrepreneurs do not decide at first sight to operate in 
informality in order to avoid paying taxes. They make this choice to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and 
corruption. But this choice will lead to a decrease in tax mobilization later on. Dessy and Pallage (2001) confirm 
this thinking by developing a theoretical model that offers an endogenous differentiation of the effect of the size 
of the informal economy on the tax burden between rich and poor countries.  Similarly, Alm and Torgler (2004) 
reveal that the choice to pay taxes depends on the quality of the institutions and differs between countries. They 
find that a large size of the informal economy is associated with low tax mobilization. But they also find that the 
size of informality is explained by the quality of institutions. Furthermore, Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) 
postulate that higher tax rates on the formal sector combined with high regulation induce firms to operate in the 
informal sector, which necessarily leads to an increase in the informal economy in a country. They also point out 
that the shift of such enterprises to the informal economy undermines public finances and further weakens the 
capacity of the State to protect property rights.  
Empirically, Alm and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) conduct their study on a sample of developed and developing 
countries for the year 2000. They find that an improvement in the quality of institutions reduces the size of the 
informal sector, which allows for a better capacity to mobilize fiscal resources. However, they report that the 
negative effect of the size of the informal sector on the tax burden diminishes as the level of economic development 
increases. The latter depends on the quality of the institutions as shown by Acemuglu (2005). Also, Torgler and 
Schneider (2007), using 25 different proxies for measure governance and institutional quality. They note that good 
quality institutional factors lead to a small size informal economy. They conduct their study based on three 
hypotheses. First, an increase in governance and institutional quality reduces ceteris paribus the size of informal 
economies. Second, the greater the opportunities for direct political participation by citizens, the smaller the margin 
for growth of the informal economy. Finally, higher tax morale, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, 
reduces the size of the informal economy in a country, other things being equal. In a similar vein, Davoodi and 
Grigorian (2007) in their study of Armenia, find that countries with low levels of political and social conflict have 
lower levels of informal activity and high tax mobilization. For these authors, the size of the informal sector 
depends on tax morale and the cost of tax evasion and tax fraud. On the other hand, Lavallée and Roubaud (2012), 
using data from an original series of 1-2-3 surveys of urban households in West Africa conducted in seven major 
WAEMU cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Lomé, Niamey and Ouagadougou) from 2001 to 2002, 
establish that in West African capitals, informal production units are not greatly affected by corruption attempts 
by public officials. However, they point out that it is more likely that larger firms and transport sector enterprises 
are subject to predatory behaviour by state officials. Also, they show that corruption greatly reduces the 
performance of companies and thus their ability to contribute to countries' tax revenues. 
In sum, first, it is accepted in the literature that an increase in the size of the unregistered economy erodes the 
tax base. Second, an improvement in the quality of institutions positively and directly affects the tax burden. 
Finally, it is shown that the quality of institutions affects the tax burden through the size of the informal sector. 
Unfortunately, this literature does not take a position on the indirect effect of the quality of institutions on the tax 
burden through the informal sector in the particular case of Sub-Saharan African countries. The following 
empirical analysis attempts to address this issue.    
 
3. Methodology  
This section presents models, variables of this research, and estimation techniques. 
 
3.1 The model 
The literature on the determinants of the tax burden uses Lotz and Morss (1967) as a basic model to explain the 
level of a country's tax burden rate. Indeed, their model has served as a theoretical framework for empirical work 
(Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam, 1997; Piancastelli, 2001; Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, 2004; Gupta, 2007) 
with some extensions. Thus, the theoretical function of analysis is defined as follows:       
                        𝑇 𝑌⁄ 𝑓 𝑋 …𝑋             (1) 
Where T is total tax revenue, Y is income, T ∕ Y is the total tax burden rate, and 𝑋 𝑖 1 …𝑛   is various 
explanatory variables. By specifying the theoretical model described above in a panel, the empirical equation to 
be estimated is as follows: 
0 1 2 (2)it it itTTP Inst X        
With TTP the rate of total tax pressure, Inst an indicator of the quality of institutions, X is vector of control 
variables, the variants of α are the vectors of coefficients and, ε designates the error terms.  
 
3.2 Study Variables 
The study uses annual data from 1996 to 2015 for the eight (8) WAEMU countries. 
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The endogenous variable the rate of total tax pressure is represented by Tax burden rate 
The Tax Burden (Tax) is measured by the tax ratio, which is the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP. This measure 
is the most widely used in the literature (Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Ghura, 1998; Bird, Vazquez, and 
Torgler, 2004; Gupta, 2007; Botlhole, 2010). Fiscal revenues will be measured by the sum of direct taxes, indirect 
taxes, taxes on foreign trade, and non-fiscal or parafiscal revenues (including social contributions, fines and 
penalties, etc.). Data on fiscal pressure comes from the African Development Bank (ADB, 2018). 
Variables of interest: Quality of Institutions and the size of the Informal Sector 
The quality of institutions (Inst) is measured by the six (6) governance quality indicators of Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton (KKZ) of the World Bank as well as by the composite index of institutional quality constructed 
from these 6 indicators. These six indicators are: Freedom of Expression and Accountability (VA), Political 
Stability (PS), Government Effectiveness (GE), Quality of regulation (QR), Rule of Law (RL) and Corruption 
Control (CC). These indicators are taken from the database of Worldwide Governance Indicators, (WGI, 2018). 
The Composite Institutional Quality Index is calculated using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method. 
PCA is a factorial method that consists of reducing the number of variables used to describe a phenomenon, it’s 
noted Inst in this paper.  
Measuring the Size of informal Sector (IS) has always been the subject of much debate. In this study, the rate of 
vulnerable employment is used as a proxy for the size of the informal sector in WAEMU countries. Vulnerable 
employment includes family workers and own-account workers. This type of employment is generally associated 
with informality and poor working conditions because people in vulnerable employment are more likely to have 
informal work arrangements and less likely to have social security coverage and to benefit from social dialogue 
(Gammarano, 2018). Similarly, De Soto (1989), Wilson, Velis, and Cheeseman (2006), Bramah and King (2006), 
Brata and Gunadi (2010), Bocquier, Nordman, and Vescovo (2010), Meagher (2010), Charmes (2014), and, Gherbi 
(2014) link vulnerable jobs to informal sector jobs. It is assumed that an increase in the rate of vulnerable 
employment indicates a high size of the informal sector. According to the literature, like the agricultural sector, 
this sector is hardly taxable. Thus, a negative relationship is expected between the rate of vulnerable employment 
and the rate of tax burden. Data on the size of the informal economy comes from the World Bank's Word 
Development Indicators database (WDI, 2018). 
Control variables 
These variables concern the traditional determinants of the tax burden. And the data come from the World Bank's 
Word Development Indicators database (WDI, 2018). 
Level of development (GDPh) is approximated by the logarithm of GDP per capita. The higher the GDP per 
capita, the higher the taxable potential and the easier it is to raise taxes (Lotz and Morss, 1970). Thus the expected 
sign is positive.  
Share of agriculture in GDP (Agri) is supposed to have a negative effect on the tax burden. The agricultural 
sector is difficult to tax because of the predominance of subsistence activities and often dispersed production units 
(Shin, 1969; Attila, Chambas, and Combes, 2009).  
Share of Natural Resources in GDP (NR) can have a positive effect on the rate of fiscal pressure because this 
sector generates significant revenues (Bahl, 1971; Chelliah, 1971). On the other hand, according to the theory of 
the "natural resource curse" evoked by Auty (1997), resource-rich countries tend to neglect tax revenue 
mobilization because of the large rents offered by this sector (Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam, 1997). Thus, the 
expected sign is ambiguous. 
Degree of openness (OP) measures the volume of trade (imports and exports) with the rest of the world relative 
to GDP. An increase in the degree of openness should be accompanied by an increase in customs revenues and 
thus an improvement in the country's tax burden, all other things being equal (Lotz and Morss, 1967; Ndiaye and 
Korsu, 2014).  
According to Botlhole (2010), the costs of Inflation (Inf) to tax revenue mobilization can come from three 
sources. Indeed, the first is the presence of the Olivera-Tanzi effect, that is, the negative effect of inflation on tax 
revenues in the presence of collection delays. In addition, the exercise of the tax on certain products with specific 
tax rates will not automatically adjust to inflation. Finally, the reduction of the tax base because households, in 
order to protect their wealth from the corrosive effects of inflation, can substitute them for goods or services that 
are probably less taxed at home. A negative sign is expected. 
 
3.3 Estimation method  
It should be noted that preliminary tests are necessary in order to choose the appropriate estimation technique. In 
this regard, stationarity and cointegration tests are carried out. These tests help to avoid spurious regressions. For 
the present study, the test of Maddala and Wu (1999) as well as that of Choi (2002). The results1 show that out of 
a total of fourteen (14) variables, only one variable (inflation) is level stationary and the others are integrated of 
 
1 Appendix 2 
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order one. Thus, there is a presumption of cointegration, i.e. the existence of a long-term relationship between the 
variables. To test this relationship, Pedroni's (1999) test is used. The results1 indicate that four of Pedroni's seven 
statistics reject the null hypothesis of non-cointegration between the variables. There is therefore a long term 
relationship between the variables. 
Following the various preliminary tests, the Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimators 
proposed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) are given for the estimates2. These models allow for the presence of 
variables that can be integrated of different orders, either I (0) or I (1), or cointegrated (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). 
The MG estimator imposes no restrictions on either the coefficients or the estimated variances. The DFE estimator 
assumes that the parameters are identical between individuals. The PMG estimator considers that the model 
constant, as well as the short-term coefficients and error variances, may differ between individuals. However, the 
long-term coefficients are constrained to be identical for all units. Given that WAEMU member countries are 
working towards long-term convergence of the total tax burden rate (which must be greater than or equal to 20% 
in 2019 for all member countries), the PMG estimator is then preferable for the purposes of this study (Keho, 
2015). This choice is also validated by the Hausman test, as all the probabilities associated with the tests are greater 
than 5% for all specifications. 
  The model to be estimated is as follows: 
 Referring to Pesaran et al. (1999), i.e. a sample of N individuals observed over T periods, with  , *N T N N ; 






it ij i t ij it i it it
j
Tax T dax Z    

      , 1, 2 , ;? , 2 ,i N t T    (3) 
Where TTPit is the explained variable, 
p
itZ  is a matrix of explanatory variables, of format (kX1); i  represents 
the individual fixed effects (countries); ij  are coefficients assigned to the lagged dependent variables ,i t jTTP  , 
and 'ij  is a matrix of scalars of format (1 X k). If the variables are cointegrated, then the error term 𝜀 is a 
stationary process. In this case, the model can be re-specified as an error-correction model in which the short-term 




1ΔTax φ (Tax )  ΔVI VI
n
it i it i it iji it iit i it i
j
it tx dZ      


         (4) 
Where i is the vector of long-term coefficients and ∆ the variation operator between two successive times. The 
adjustment coefficient i and the long-term coefficients i are the parameters of interest. It is expected that i  < 0.  
 
4. Results of estimates and interpretations        
The results of the effect of the quality of institutions and the highlighting of the transmission channel by the size 
of the informal sector with their interpretations are presented in this section.  
 
4.1. Descriptive and graphical analyzis of the data 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The average tax burden over the study period is equal to 14.96%, with a 
minimum value of 7.57 and a maximum value of 23.19. While that of the informal sector is 78.87% and varies 
between a minimum of 44.12 and a maximum of 91.36. It can be seen that on average over the period of the study, 
the size of the informal sector is far greater than the tax burden. It also shows that, on average, the variables 
indicating the quality of institutions are all negative. This indicates that the quality of institutions is very low in 
the study area for the period under study. The average growth rate of real GDP per capita is 2.71%. On average 
the contribution of agriculture to GDP is 31.5%; that of natural resources is 9.64%. Trade openness represents on 
average 62.67% of GDP. Finally, the inflation rate averaged 4.14%, which is relatively low. 
  
 
1 Appendix 3 
2 Appendix 5 
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Table 1 : Descriptive statistics 
Variables Average 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximun 
Variables of interest 
Tax 14.96841 3.427483 7.578451 23.1909 
IS 78.87181 14.5294 44.121 91.361 
Institutional variables 
VA -0.4096778 0.5252139 -1.506182 .4259807 
PS -0.401015 0.689471 -2.264047 1.04893 
GE -0.7946544 0.3860821 -1.61314 .0762425 
RQ -0.5425045 0.3198519 -1.261222 -.047789 
RL -0.6775607 0.4374738 -1.802306 .0656045 
CC -0.6760581 0.3655398 -1.538464 .176479 
Inst -2.47e-09 1.000001 -2.119982 2.255733 
Controls variables 
GDPh 2.712512 0.2164734 2.202111 3.184867 
AGRI 31.50087 9.931655 11.88239 61.41626 
NR 9.643466 5.927427 2.42534 31.59078 
OP 62.67346 18.45338 30.73252 125.0334 
INF 4.148106 8.109476 -9.823833 80.89967 
Source: Authors 
The graph below shows the joint evolution of the size of the informal sector, the tax burden and the quality 
of institutions over the period of the study. It can be seen that the evolution of the quality of institutions is not 
stable. In fact, the curve relative to the quality of the institutions evolves in a jagged pattern. Nevertheless, we 
observe a downward trend. The rate of fiscal pressure is much lower than the size of the informal sector. However, 
the evolution of these two indicators seems stable over the period, because it does not fluctuate much, unlike the 
quality of the institutions. 























Source: Authors  
 
4.2. Effect of the quality of institutions on the tax burden  
The main results from the estimates are presented in Table 2. These results show positive and statistically 
significant coefficients at the 5% threshold for the various indicators of the quality of KKZ institutions. This means 
that an improvement in these different institutional aspects promotes better tax revenue mobilization in WAEMU 
countries. These results corroborate those of Ndiaye (2014). The results are robust because they do not depend on 
the indicator measuring the quality of institutions. Indeed, the coefficient associated with the composite index is 
also positive and statistically significant at the 5%  threshold. The poor fiscal performance of WAEMU countries 
is therefore the result of the poor quality of institutions. For this reason, improving institutional quality is essential 
for increasing the fiscal pressure in these countries. In fact, an institutional environment characterized by 
transparency in the management of public affairs, freedom of voting, press and expression, and the possibility of 
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denouncing the misconduct of leaders, accompanied by the possibility of losing power through a vote of approval 
by citizens, improves public confidence in government and therefore provides a considerable incentive for 
taxpayers to pay taxes. Moreover, a government's ability to formulate sound policies and implement them, and the 
state's respect with citizens for the institutions governing their economic and social interactions, leads to efficient 
and effective tax administrations, which facilitates tax collection. 
Furthermore, the analysis of marginal effects, presented in Appendix 4 Table 3, reveals that the variables 
"rule of law", "freedom of expression and accountability" and, "government effectiveness" are the institutional 
aspects that have a strong influence on the total tax burden rate, compared to other KKZ indicators. Indeed, all 
other things being equal, it appears that a one-point improvement in "rule of law", "freedom of expression and 
accountability", and "government effectiveness" is accompanied by an increase in the total tax burden rate by 8.5, 
4 and 2.63 points, respectively. These results imply that WAEMU countries should, primarily, focus on respect 
for the rule of law, strengthen democratic quality, and improve government efficiency in order to improve tax 
revenue mobilization capacity. With regard to the control variables, overall, it appears that the level of development 
and trade openness improve the fiscal pressure in WAEMU countries, while inflation, the share of agriculture and 
the share of natural resources in GDP reduce the rate of fiscal pressure. These results corroborate those of Attila, 
Chambas, and Combes (2009) and Keho (2015). 
Table 2: Long-Term Results of Estimating the Total Tax Burden Equation 
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
VA 4,0079*** 
(0,000) 
      
SP  1,8886*** 
(0,000) 
     
EG   2,6327*** 
(0,000) 
    
QR    1,8639** 
(0,012) 
   
RL     8,5013*** 
(0,000) 
  
CC      2,1874*** 
(0,000) 
 


















































































































Notes : les p-values sont reportées entre les parenthèses. *** ; ** et * indiquent respectivement la significativité à 
1%, 5% et 10%. La force de rappel est négative et significative dans toutes les estimations donc le modèle est 
valide. 
Source : Authors 
 
4.3. Highlighting the transmission channel: the size of the informal sector 
Theoretically, if the rate of fiscal pressure depends on the share of the informal sector in GDP, which in turn 
depends on the quality of institutions, the effect of institutional quality on fiscal pressure can be decomposed as 
follows: 
                       (3) 
 
The aim is to distinguish between the direct and indirect effects of institutional quality, based on the model of Mo 
(2001), also used by Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) and Attila, Chambas, and Combes (2009). In practice, first the 
direct effect is calculated from equation (2), the results of which are summarized in Table 3. Then, the effect of 
the channel of the size of the informal sector (the indirect effect) is evaluated using the results of the estimation of 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online)  
Vol.11, No.20, 2020 
 
103 
equation (2) and those of equation (4). Finally, the total effect is obtained by summing the direct and indirect effect. 
 
𝑠𝑖 𝛽  𝛽 𝑤𝑔𝑖  𝜗                             (4) 
 
Where if represents the size of the informal sector as a % of GDP, wgi the composite index of the quality of 
institutions, the variants of β are the vectors of coefficients and, ϑ denotes the error terms. Estimating this equation 
by the PMG method gives this result: 
 
𝑆𝐼 20,8517 1,0337𝑊𝐺𝐼       𝐸𝐶 0,2675  
(0,001) ***  (0,027) **        (0,001)*** 
 
The results in Table 3 give the direct and indirect effects of the quality of institutions on the fiscal pressure within 
WAEMU countries. It shows that a 1% improvement in institutional quality directly increases the tax burden rate 
by 42.47%. It also shows that 24.56% of this increase in the tax burden is channeled through the informal sector 
(indirect effect).  In other words, improving the quality of the institutional environment by 1% reduces the size of 
the informal sector by about 103.37%, and this reduction in the size of the informal sector in turn leads to an 
increase in the tax burden rate of 24.56%. Consequently, a 1% improvement in the quality of institutions has a 
total effect of about 67% on the tax burden. The contribution of the informal sector to the total effect of the quality 
of institutions on the tax burden is 36.64%. This means that nearly 36.64% of the total effect of institutional quality 
on tax revenue is explained by the size of the informal sector. This implies that the size of the informal sector 
constitutes a very important channel for transmitting the effect of institutional factors on tax revenue mobilization 
in the WAEMU zone. For this reason, these countries need to make institutional changes to improve the business 
climate in order to reduce informal activities in the economy. In this regard, Schneider and Enste (2000) argue that 
good quality institutions improve the business climate, which encourages firms to operate in the formal sector, 
thus broadening the tax base. Overall, the results obtained validate the study's hypothesis that the total tax burden 
of WAEMU economies is largely explained by the quality of institutions, and the size of the informal sector is an 
important channel for transmitting this effect. 
Table 3: Effect of Institutional Quality through the Informal Sector 
Effet direct Canal secteur informel Effet total Contribution relative à l’effet 
total 




The objective of this research was to analyze the effect of the quality of institutions on the rate of total fiscal 
pressure through the informal sector in WAEMU countries over the period 1996-2015, using the PMG estimator 
for econometric investigation. The results show that good quality institutions improve tax revenue mobilization in 
WAEMU countries. Also, improving the quality of the institutional environment by 1% reduces the size of the 
informal sector by about 103.37%, and this reduction in the size of the informal sector in turn leads to an increase 
in the tax burden rate of 24.56%. Consequently, a 1% improvement in the quality of institutions has a total effect 
of about 67% on the tax burden. The contribution of the informal sector to the total effect of the quality of 
institutions on the tax burden is 36.64%. In other words, 36.64% of the total effect of institutional quality on tax 
revenue is due to the informal sector. Following these results, the paper recommends that WAEMU countries 
institute effective and efficient institutional reforms that will reduce the size of the informal sector in order to 
improve tax revenue. 
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KKZ governance indicators 
Freedom of Expression and Accountability (VA): Opportunity for a country's citizens to participate in the 
appointment of government members. This indicator includes indicators measuring different aspects of the 
political process, civil liberties, political rights and media independence.  
Political Stability (PS): Perceptions of the likelihood that an incumbent government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by possible unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.  
Government Effectiveness (GE): Perceptions of the quality of public services provided and administration, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressure, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to political leaders.  
Quality of regulation (QR): Perceptions of the government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that enable and promote private sector development. 
Rule of Law (RL): A society's ability to create an environment in which fair and predictable rules provide the 
basis for economic and social interactions in the protection of property rights. This indicator covers perceptions 
of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the ability to enforce and 
respect contracts.  
Corruption Control (CC): Perceptions of corruption defined as the abuse of public power for private gain. It 
covers both petty corruption, grand corruption, and capture of the state. 
 
Appendix 2 
Table 1 : Unit root test results 
 
Variables 
Niveau Différence première  
Conclusion MW Choi MW Choi 





















































































































































































































    I (0) 
IS 21,2479 
(0,1692) 















 Notes : Les valeurs entre les parenthèses sont les p-values. ***, ** et * désignent respectivement la stationnarité 
aux seuils de 1%, 5% et 10%. I (0) et I (1) désignent respectivement la stationnarité de la variable à niveau et 
d’ordre 1.  
Source : Authors 
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Table 2 : Panel cointegration test results for fiscal pressure 



















































































































Source : Authors 
 
Annexe 4 
Table 3 : Marginal effects  
Variables Effets marginaux 
Freedom of Expression and Accountability 4,0079*** 
(0,000) 
Political Stability  1,8886*** 
(0,000) 
Government Effectiveness (GE)  2,6327*** 
(0,000) 
Quality of regulation (QR) 1,8639** 
(0,012) 
Rule of Law (RL)  8,5013*** 
(0,000) 
Corruption Control (CC)  2,1874*** 
(0,000) 
Source : Authors 
 
Annexe 5 
Tableau 4 : Hausman Test 
Variables chi2(7) chi2 Probability 
 
Specification 1 0,79 0,9976 
 
Specification 2 0,89 0,8342 
 
Specification 3 1,02 0,9946 
 
Specification 4 0,8 0,9975 
 
Specification 5 0,79 0,8751 
 
Specification 6 0,81 0,7745 
 
Specification 7 1,02 0,9946 
 
